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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA
MORRIS HARDWICK SCHNEIDER,
LLC, and LANDCASTLE TITLE, LLC,

)
)

)
Plaintiffs,

)
)

Civil Action File No. 20l4-CV-250583

)

v.

)

NATHAN E. HARDWICK IV, and DIVOT
HOLDINGS, LLC

)
)
)

Defendants.

)

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANT HARDWICK'S
COUNTERCLAIMS AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND STAY
This matter is before on the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Defendant
Hardwick's Counterclaims. Upon consideration of the briefs submitted on the Motion this Court
finds as follows:
I. AJJegations
Plaintiffs Morris Hardwick Schneider, LLC (MHS) and LandCastle Title, LLC (LCT)
filed their initial lawsuit against Defendant Nathan E. Hardwick IV (Hardwick) on August 25,
2014 alleging conversion, unjust enrichment, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, among other
claims. On the same day, MRS and Landcastle Acquisition Corp entered into an agreement
called Transfer and Assignment of Claims and Agreement to Cooperate (the "Assignment").
Under the Assignment, MRS assigned all of its causes of action related to recoupment of funds it
contends were misappropriated by Hardwick to LandCastle Acquisition Corp., a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Fidelity National Financial, Inc. LandCastle Acquisition Corp. is the sole member
and owner of LCT.
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Hardwick filed his Affirmative Defenses, Answer and Counterclaims on January 5,2015.
Hardwick listed setoff as his Seventh Affirmative Defense ("Plaintiffs' claims must be set off
against Defendants' claims against Plaintiffs") and asserted four counterclaims: (1) Breach of
Contract against MRS, (2) Money Had and Received against MHS and LCT; (3) Unjust
Enrichment against MHS and LCT; and (4) Attorneys' Fees and Expenses of Litigation against
MRS and LeT.
MRS, now known as Morris

I Schneider I Wittstadt,

Chapter 11 bankruptcy on July 5,2015.2

In Re: Morris I Schneider I Wittstadt Va., PLLC, et. al.,

Civil Action No. 15-33370-KLP (E.D. Va. Bankr.).
dated August 28,2015,

LLC, J filed a voluntary petition for

The Bankruptcy Court entered an Order

demanding all persons asserting a prepetition claim against MHS must

file a proof of such claim on or prior to October 30,2015 at 5:00 pm. The Notice of Deadlines
for Filing Proofs of Claim states creditors who fail to file will be "[fjorever barred, estopped and
enjoined from asserting such claim against the debtors, their successors, their chapter 11 estates
and their respective property .... " Notice ofthe deadline was served on Hardwick and
Hardwick's counsel, Carlock Copeland & Stair, LLP, on August 29,2015 by first-class mail.
Hardwick did not file a proof of claim.
Before the expiration of the proof of claim filing deadline, on October 2, 2015, the
Bankruptcy Court entered a Stipulation and Agreed Order Regarding Agreements Between
Certain Debtors and Landcastle Acquisition Corp. (the "Stipulation").

The Stipulation

acknowledged the assignment of certain ofMHS's claims, including claims against Hardwick, to
Landcastle Acquisition:

After the initiation of this suit, MHS became Morris I Schneider I Wittstadt, LLC. The Court
will use MHS interchangeabl y to refer to both of these entities.
2 Several MRS-related entities were named in the bankruptcy proceeding but not LCT.
I
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6. All Recoupment Claims' have been properly assigned to Landcastle
Acquisition.
7. The Recoupment Claims can be prosecuted by Landcastle Acquisition
in the respective names ofMSW, MSWLAW, Landcastle Title,
Landcastle Acquisition and/or Landcastle Acquisition's assignees, in the
sole discretion of Land castle Acquisition or its assignees.
8. All recoveries from the Recoupment Claims are and shall remain the
property of Landcastle Acquisition, subject to the sharing arrangement
with MSW provided for in the Assignment and Operating Agreement.

The Stipulation also modified the automatic stay to allow LandCastle Acquisition to pursue the
Recoupment Claims. Neither the Assignment nor the Stipulation expressly assigns MHS's
liabilities to LCT or Landcastle Acquisition. As consideration of the assignment, Landcastle
Acquisition evidently covered MRS's and Landcastle Title's escrow shortfalls totaling over $20
million.
The bankruptcy court confirmed the Chapter 11 plan on August 11, 2016.
Plaintiffs have served discovery in the case at hand to determine the basis for Hardwick's
counterclaims. On January 22,2015, Hardwick served unverified responses to Plaintiffs First
Interrogatories, but on January 27,2016, shortly before he was indicted on embezzlement
charges, Hardwick withdrew all of his prior interrogatory responses. In a new response to the
First Interrogatories, Hardwick invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
and refused to answer any of the questions. Hardwick also invoked his Fifth Amendment
privilege on January 25,2016, in response to Plaintiffs Second Interrogatories and in March of
2016 during his deposition during which he refused to answer any questions. Hardwick has
agreed to an extension of the discovery period in this case until February 28,2017, but opposes a

"Recoupment Claims" is a defined term. Bankruptcy Court documents define this term as
"only those claims assigned to Landcastle Acquisition Corp. pursuant to the Landcastle
Agreements ... " but these Landcastle Agreements are not before the Court.
3
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stay of discovery pending criminal proceedings.

Both parties predict criminal proceedings may

consume more than a year and half.
Plaintiffs seek dismissal of Hardwick's

Counterclaim because (1) he failed to file a proof

of claim for his Counterclaim in the MHS bankruptcy; and (2) he refused to provide discovery.

II. Standard of Review
Plaintiffs move to dismiss Hardwick's Counterclaim and attached exhibits to their
motion, including copies of the arraignment hearing, bankruptcy proceedings, and
interrogatories. In opposition to Plaintiffs motion, Hardwick filed a response to which he
attached numerous exhibits, including bankruptcy filings, other court filings, emails, and a
portion of Hardwick's deposition transcript. Generally, documents attached to a ''brief in
support of [a] motion to dismiss ... cannot be considered in deciding the motion to dismiss."
Babalola v. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A., 324 Ga. App. 750, 751, n. 4 (2013). Instead, "a trial court

has the option to consider evidence attached to a motion to dismiss and brief in support thereof,
[and] when it does so it converts the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment,
governed by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56." Cox Enterprises v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 153 (2000).
If the trial court opts to convert the motion, the court has the burden of providing notice
to the opposing party. A party may waive this formal notice requirement if it does not object to
the reliance upon the evidence and instead submits his own material. Cox Enterprises, Inc. v.
Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 153 (2000). When both parties submit evidence in connection with a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "there is no indication of prejudice due to the trial court's
failure to give notice of the actual nature of the pending action." [d. (quoting Robison v.
Green, 228 Ga. App. 27, 28 (I 997».
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Here, the formal notice requirement has been waived by both parties through their
submission of exhibits and their failure to object to reliance upon this evidence. Therefore, "[a]U
the parties, in effect, treated the motion to dismiss as being converted to a motion for summary

judgment, and no party was denied an opportunity to respond to evidence submitted." Morrell v.
WellstarHealth System, Inc., 280 Ga. App. 1, 1 (2006).
Summary Judgment should be granted when the movant shows "that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). "A defendant may do this by showing the court the documents,
affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient
to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiff's case." Scarborough v.
Hallam, 240 Ga. App. 829, 829 (1999).
To avoid summary judgment, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials in his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Code
section, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." § 9-11-56( e).
The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Morgan v.
Barnes, 221 Ga. App. 653,654 (1996).
Hl. Hardwick's Failure to File Proof of Claim in Bankruptcy Proceeding
Plaintiffs argue Hardwick's failure to file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy case bars the
counterclaims against MRS as a matter of law. To participate in the distribution of a debtor's
assets, Federal Bankruptcy Rule 3003( c) requires all creditors file a proof of claim within a time
prescribed by the bankruptcy court. If a potential claimant fails to file a claim by the bar date,
the creditor is "forever barred, estopped and enjoined from bringing the claim against the
Debtors." Only the bankruptcy court, in its discretion, may accept a motion to file a late claim.
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Hardwick asserts he was not required to file a proof of claim because the Recoupment
Claims in tins lawsuit were no longer debtor assets and instead were assigned to non-debtor,
Landcastle Acquisitions, before the bankruptcy case was filed. Hardwick argues the general
principle that "the assignee of a chose in action is ordinarily subject to any setoff or counterclaim
available to the obligor against the assignor, and to all other defenses and equities that could
have been asserted against the assignor at the time of the assignment."

6 Am. Jur. 2d

Assignments § 116. In other words, Hardwick claims Landcastle Acquisitions assumed not just

the Recoupment Claims but MHS's Liabilities to him as well. Hardwick cites no Georgia law in
support. Further, the Assignment did not state that MHS was assigning any outstanding
liabilities to Landcastle Acquisitions. There is no indication that Landcastle Acquisitions was
assuming liabilities in the Assignment or in the Stipulation issued by the Bankruptcy Court.
Therefore, Hardwick remained a creditor ofMHS and is barred from collecting any debt for
failure to file a proof of claim.
Hardwick next argues even if the Court determines he was a creditor ofMHS and not
Landcastle Acquisitions, his claim for setoff may still be asserted under 11 U.S.C.A. § 553. This
Section states nothing in Title 11 affects "any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by
such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title
against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case, ... " Hardwick cites a bankruptcy opinion stating that filing a proof of claim is not
necessarily a prerequisite to the right of setoff if both claims arose before the bankruptcy filing.
In re Durango Georgia Paper Co., 309 B.R. 394,403 n.4 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2004) (citing The
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Conner Ins. Agency, Inc., No. 93-20279, 1994 WL 16006138, *3
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. Nov. 4, 1994)).
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Even if this Court were to apply 11 U.S.C.A. § 553,4 setoff would not be allowed because
the debts are not mutual. "Mutuality requires that the debts 'be in the same right and between
the same parties, standing in the same capacity.'" Darr v. Muratore, 8 F.3d 854, 860 (1st Cir.
1993) (quoting 4 Collier on Bankruptcy § 553.04 (15th ed. 1992)). ''The burden of proof is on
the creditor to prove entitlement to setoff." In re Fairfield Plantation, Inc., 147 B.R. 946, 951
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992) (quotation omitted).
mutuality of the debts owed.

Here, Hardwick has failed to show the requisite

Likewise, there is no right to setoff against claims of conversion or

breach of fiduciary duty. See Darr, 8 F. 3d. at 860; see also In re Windsor Commc'ns Grp., Inc.,
79 B.R. 210,216 (E.D. Pa, 1987) ("there is no valid right to setoff where conversion has
occurred."). Here, Plaintiffs raise claims against Hardwick for both breach of fiduciary duty and
conversion.

As such, the Motion to Dismiss Counts I through N against MHS is GRANTED.

Counts II, III and IV are directed against LCT. LeT was not a bankruptcy debtor. There
is no evidence that Hardwick brought these claims against LCT in its capacity as the assignee of
the Recoupment Claims. Thus, these claims brought against LCT are not affected by Hardwick's
failure to file a Notice of Claim. The Motion is DENIED as to LCT.

IV. Fifth Amendment
Plaintiffs next argue Hardwick's refusal to provide discovery in conjunction with his
withholding consent to a stay requires dismissal with prejudice of the Counterclaims against both
LCT and MRS. "A trial court has inherent authority to dismiss sua sponte a complaint in an
appropriate case." Paden v. Rudd, 294 Ga. App. 603,606 (2008) (quoting Ga. Receivables, Inc.

v. Williams, 218 Ga. App. 313, 313 (1995)). "The Fifth Amendment, which may be invoked in
civil as well as criminal actions, 'shields against compelled self-incrimination, not legitimate

Georgia law also allows setoff. See O.C.G.A. § 13-7-1, et seq. "Setoff must be between the
same parties and in their own right." O.C.G.A. § 13-7-4.

4
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inquiry, in the truth seeking process.'"

Anderson v. S. Guar. Ins. Co. of Georgia, 235 Ga. App.

306, 311 (1998)(citing Axson v. Nat. Surety COIp., 254 Ga. 248, 249 (1985)). Generally, there is
no unconstitutional infringement of the Fifth Amendment privilege by forcing an individual to
risk disadvantage in a civil case by refusing to provide material facts for fear of selfincrimination in a pending criminal case. See Anderson v, S. Guar. Ins. Co.. of Georgia, 235 Ga.
App. 306, 311 (1998). Dismissal has been held to be an appropriate sanction when a civil
plaintiff facing criminal charges on the same subject matter failed to comply with an order
compelling discovery over that plaintiff's Fifth Amendment objections. Master v. Savannah Sur.
Assocs., Inc., 148 Ga. App. 678, 679 (1979).5 Plaintiffs seek dismissal ofthe counterclaims

under the Court's inherent power to eliminate prejudice resulting from Hardwick's failure to
produce discovery relevant to the counterclaims he asserts.
In this case, Hardwick is seeking affirmative relief in his counterclaims while at the same
time refusing to answer questions material to that relief, including questions regarding the
amount of damages sought and the factual basis for those claims. He has refused to consent to a
stay though criminal proceedings are pending against him and Hardwick is pursuing discovery,
including noticing several depositions. Discovery is ongoing but Plaintiffs contend Hardwick's
failure to provide any information has left them without means to discover the basis of
Hardwick's alleged Counterclaim or properly defend against the Counterclaim. To the extent
Hardwick has non-privileged information to support his counterclaims, this should be produced
in the course of discovery. To the extent Hardwick attempts to withhold information in support
of his own claims under his Fifth Amendment privilege, he is prejudicing his own case.

Plaintiffs have not filed motions to compel responses to discovery because they do not
challenge that Hardwick has a justifiable basis to assert his Fifth Amendment privileges.
5
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Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Hardwick's counterclaims on the grounds that Hardwick has
asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege is DENIED.
Plaintiffs have also recently filed a motion seeking a protective order and stay. Plaintiffs
wish to stay six depositions that have been noticed until the criminal proceedings against
Hardwick have been resolved or Hardwick can no longer assert his Fifth Amendment privilege.
Hardwick opposes the motion. For the reasons stated in this Court's Order dated June 6,2016,
the pending Motion for Protective Order and Stay in DENIED.

SO ORDERED, this 14th day of February, 2017.

~~.
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MELV:WESTMORELAND, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit

9

Copies to:
J

Edward D. Burch
David C. Newman
SMITH, GAMBREL & RUSSELL, LLP
1230 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Promenade, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3592
Tel: (404) 815-3500
Fax: (404) 815-3509
eburch@sgrlaw.com
dnewman@sgrlaw.com
Counsel/or Morris Hardwick Schneider, LLC

Attorneys for DefeAdants
Edward T.M. Garland
Robin N. Loeb
Matthew D. Daley
GARLAND, SAMUEL & LOEB, P .C.
3151 Maple Drive, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia
Tel: (404) 262-2225
Fax: (404) 365-5041
etg@gsllaw.com
rnl@gsllaw.com
mdd@gsllaw.com

W. Reese Willis, III
Austin E. James
FIDELITY NATIONAL LAW GROUP
4170 Ashford Dunwoody Road - Suite 460
Atlanta, Georgia 30319
Tel: (770) 325-4831
Fax: (770) 325-4843
Reese.willis@fnf.com
Austin. iames@fnf.com
Counsel for LandCastle Title, LLC
l~-

"

JohnA. Hom
David M. Chaiken
J. Russell Phillips
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
600 U.S. Courthouse
75 Ted TumerDrive, S.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303
Tel: (404) 581-6000
Fax: (404) 581-6181
David.chaiken@usdoj.gov
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